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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to rethinking the Social Market 
Economy with respect to modern economic and technological structures. 
In doing so, we explore the limits of the traditional Social Market Economy 
for solving the economic problems of our time. 
We find that the Social Market Economy's rigid focus on competitive 
markets as the corner stone for a decentralized economic order has 
become outdated and that the basic principle of competition should be 
extended to decentralized institutions and policies. It is proposed that the 
preferred choice of specific institutions and policies should reflect their 
legitimacy, i.e. a combination of their effectiveness and their public 
acceptance. On the basis of our findings, we propose to amend some of 
the principles of the traditional Social Market Economy and to supplement 
them with new ones. 
The principles relate to the economy, to politics, as well as to the 
uncertainty inherent in the long run future. The proposed principles are 
illustrated with general examples covering regional economic policy, 
monetary policy, financial crises, and environmental sustainability. 
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'Tradition doesn't mean holding on to the ashes, it means passing the flame' 
 attributed to Thomas More (1478 - 1535) 
 
1. Introduction 
Perfectly competitive markets harness the forces of competition and allow society to benefit from 
them. Market based economies realize efficiency gains through the workings of the forces of 
competition in markets, reducing wastage and misallocation of resources. This key insight is captured 
in Adam Smith’s principle of the invisible hand: in perfectly competitive markets the outcome of 
individual self-interested behaviour is to the benefit of all, as if it were directed to the common good 
by an invisible hand. But the outcomes obtained in market based economies are at times perceived 
to be unfair and unjust, despite the (theoretical) possibility of any desirable, efficient, and feasible 
outcome to be obtained through an appropriate re-distribution of income and resources.3 
The Social Market Economy provides a tried-and-tested third way approach to reap the benefits of 
market based economies whilst preventing (grossly) unfair and unjust outcomes. It does so by 
providing a broad, non-intrusive, organisational framework to achieve a workable version of a 
market based economy. This framework is founded on (individual) freedom and responsibility, within 
the bounds of commonly shared ethical values. 
Important pillars in implementing the Social Market Economy are the familiar ones of: competition; 
private property; the rule of law; freedom of contract; a predictable and stable economic 
environment; and state intervention to correct market failures. But they also include social balance. 
In an extreme interpretation of market-based economies state intervention is a “night-watchman 
state”, or “minimal state”, limited to the functions of protecting citizens against violence, theft, fraud 
and to the enforcement of contracts, and so on.4 In the context of the present paper, the state has a 
much more extensive role involving, amongst other, organizing the process of competition between 
decentralized institutions. 
Some areas in which the principles of the Social Market Economy are being or can be applied are 
competition policy; regulation; global warming; fighting poverty; free trade; the EU; and specific 
international organisations. 
Explicitly or implicitly, the principles of the Social Market Economy are at the heart of most 
contemporary national and international economic policy debates. 
 
2. Issues with the Social Market Economy 
The foundations of the Social Market Economy were developed during the 1940s and 50s, reflecting 
the economic, political and societal structures of the era, as well as the technological possibilities and 
their outlook. Its principles succeeded remarkably well in capturing the pre-requisites for successful 
                                                          
3 See, Smith (1776, Book 4, Chapter 2), Debreu (1959), and Arrow and Hahn (1971). 
4 See Nozick (1974). 
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economic development in West Germany and provided a reliable compass for its economic policies 
for almost five decades. 
The economy and society, however, have changed. Some changes are political, cultural, or legal in 
their nature and have been triggered by the processes of European integration, by globalization, and 
by the collapse of communism. Modern economies and societies are fundamentally different from 
more traditional ones. Modern production technologies strongly depend on the synergies of 
geographical concentration and tend to be driven by cluster and agglomeration effects. Further 
crucial changes in the economic sphere are the vastly enhanced roles of the financial system, of 
knowledge, of innovation, and of uncertainty. 
These changes affect the ability of traditional economic and societal institutions to harness individual 
self-interest. In particular, some market based institutions have become dysfunctional for 
channelling individual self-interest to the common good. Areas in which such misalignment used to 
be a secondary issue have acquired paramount importance. Aspects of economic and social policy 
which hardly seemed to matter have become bones of contention and ‘game changers’ for 
successful economic development. Last but not least, the global interaction of a broad range of 
different values and cultures raises new questions of what is to be considered ‘the common good’.   
 
3. Basic Structure of the Terminology 
The basic structure of the concepts for our discussion of the Social Market Economy is outlined in the 
tradition of Pieter Ruys' tri-polar model.5 The tri-polar model uses the mathematical framework of 
the Fano plane for representing three key concepts and their interconnections to understand the 
basic structure of a problem. 
The problem at the heart of economic policy in general, and of the Social Market Economy in 
particular, is the allocation of resources in a society. As the three key building blocks in determining 
this allocation we consider individuals, the economy, and politics. In the diagram below they are 
represented as the corner points of a triangle which has the allocation at its centre. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 See Ruys (1974). The model has been discussed, applied, and extended in subsequent publications. 
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The tension between individuals and the economy takes the form of scarcity; the tension between 
individuals and politics is captured in the concept of ethics; and the tension between politics and the 
economy is captured in the economic order. Each of these is represented on one of the sides of the 
triangle. 
The opposing forces of the model are the economy and politics as at the bottom of the triangle. The 
individuals in society, depicted at the top of the triangle, are the mediating force between the two. 
The lines in the triangle which connect a corner point with the opposite side of the triangle represent 
an interaction which determines the allocation. The allocation is determined by the interaction of 
individuals with the economic order, but also by the interaction between the economy and ethics, as 
well as by the interaction of scarcity and politics.  
The arcs in the diagram represent the forces connecting of the concepts of scarcity, ethics, and 
economic order around the basic problem of the allocation of resources. Here, society is the force 
shaping the connection between scarcity and ethics. Similarly, needs shape the connection between 
ethics and the economic order, whereas power is the force shaping the relation between the 
economic order and scarcity. 
Due to the logical structure of the tri-polar model, its structure can equivalently be represented by 
interchanging the position of the corner points (‘individuals’, ‘economy’, and ‘politics’) with the 
position of the relations (‘scarcity’, ‘order’, and ‘ethics’). This so called dual representation of the tri-
polar model is represented below. It provides an additional check on the soundness and consistency 
of the terminological apparatus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Critical Areas in Contemporary Economies 
Modern production technologies tend to rely on specialized resources, e.g. trained labour, advanced 
knowledge, developed infrastructure, and innovative suppliers. This makes it cost-effective for firms 
to concentrate their production in common geographical locations and to cooperate through 
specialized networks to more efficiently utilize shared resources, whilst continuing to be competitors 
in output markets. This production in clusters tends to create significant regional disparities and 
strongly enhances the ‘urban/rural’ divide.  
Contemporary economic structures are geared towards the future, which makes the alignment of 
current individual decisions and their future consequences with the ‘common good’ incomparably 
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more important. The financial system plays a key role in connecting current decisions with their 
uncertain future consequences. Traditionally, the uncertain consequences of financial decisions were 
borne by the persons or companies making these decisions. In the current financial system, this often 
no longer is the case, as financial claims are traded and reallocated. Basically, these financial claims 
are promises regarding future payments. In an uncertain and unpredictable environment they tend 
to be vulnerable to ‘opportunistic behaviour’, i.e. to lying and cheating which cannot be proven in a 
court of law. This distorts the working of the ‘invisible hand’, which cannot prevent opportunistic 
behaviour. As a consequence, its ability to align individual self-interest and the ‘common good’ in 
financial markets is significantly impaired. 
Another important change is in the role of innovation. Both the challenges and the opportunities 
mankind is facing are immense. If the challenges are not overcome, civilization may collapse and 
descend into the dark middle ages or worse, but there may also be opportunities to reach an 
unimaginably improved future. In this race against time, knowledge and innovation have become 
crucial, vastly enhancing their importance for the economy and society. Knowledge and innovations 
can be shared without being reduced or diluted. This is an extremely powerful property from the 
perspective of growth and progress, but it hampers the functioning of the invisible hand, which is 
based on linking both price and value to scarcity. If knowledge and innovations can be shared at 
negligible costs, then they fail to be ‘scarce’ and fail to create revenues for the inventor, leaving 
knowledge undiscovered and inventions unmade. Also, the creation of knowledge and innovations 
are supported by the level and specialisations of human capital. Education takes place early in life 
and the inherent uncertainty regarding young persons’ skills and talents may impede the mechanism 
of the invisible hand.  
One of the biggest obstacles in aligning current decisions with future needs is that the future is 
uncertain. This uncertainty not only means that we do not know which of the potential future 
scenarios will eventually obtain, or even the likelihoods of the different scenarios becoming reality. 
The future is uncertain in the sense that a wide range of medium and long term developments are 
beyond our imagination. There is a discrepancy between the things we know and may anticipate, and 
the things that matter to us. To some extent, ‘we simply do not know’, which leaves us torn between 
hoping for the best and fearing the worst. Inevitably, the evaluation of the consequences of decisions 
is, in part, not determined by a realistic assessment of the outcomes, but by our unreasoned hopes 
and fears. Within a corridor determined by the extent of our ignorance, any evaluation of the 
consequences of our actions can be justified by, and effectively results from, psychological 
disposition or taste. Under such circumstances, it may become appropriate to restrict active 
decisions and policy interventions to situations outside a ‘corridor of reason’ which reflects the level 
and nature of our ignorance.  
The present globalized world features the interaction of a wide range of cultures and of moral and 
ethical values, both internationally and within individual countries and societies. Individuals and 
groups of individuals may disagree about what is desirable or, indeed, what is the ‘common good’ of 
society. The principle of the invisible hand suggests that any outcome that is considered not to be 
desirable can be changed through an appropriate re-distribution of income and resources. But it may 
prove difficult to arrive at a consensus on which outcomes are undesirable and warrant changing.  
In principle, a voting process may provide a possible solution. But in general the outcomes obtained 
from the market process and the voting process may be different. As Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 
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argue, the market process should be preferred as a process of choice when the individual freedom is 
considered in isolation. The voting process should be preferred when the individual motivation in the 
choice is more relevant and gives individuals a larger feeling of participation in forming social 
decisions and, possibly, defining the public interest. In order that the voting process may yield a 
social choice which is consistent and rational, individuals should be able to agree in advance on the 
fundamental objectives of society.6 7 
 
5. Economic Institutions 
The focus of the Social Market Economy as developed in the middle of the past century is on creating 
an environment which supports the functioning of the invisible hand, thus aligning individual self-
interest with the common good, and separating economic policy from redistributive social policy. At 
the time, the economic, societal, and production structures were largely in line with the basic pre-
requisites for the functioning of the invisible hand, which strongly contributed to making the Social 
Market Economy a success story. 
During the past half century, these structures have changed dramatically, causing unregulated 
competitive markets to no longer align individual self-interest with the common good for significant 
parts of the economy. The ‘golden days’ of the initial design of the Social Market Economy are over. 
Aligning individual self-interest with the common good of society requires a structure of economic 
institutions which is much richer and much more complicated than the traditional setting of a full set 
of functioning competitive markets. 
The most familiar form of institutions is that of local and national governments, which are 
responsible for stipulated ranges of tasks within geographical areas. The design of such 
governmental structures tends to be guided by the principles of federalism and subsidiarity. Other 
well-known institutions would be (independent) central banks, state owned pension funds, and a 
range of independent regulators. It may often be convenient for the principles of federalism and 
subsidiarity to be applied to structures which respect the borders of nations and nation states, but 
this is not a necessity. Cross-border cooperation of EU-regions is an example of successful 
institutions which overcome the geographical boundaries of individual states. 
The tasks and responsibilities of local and national governments tend to be too broad, however, to 
address the contemporary issues with the functioning of the invisible hand. Normally, these ‘general 
purpose’ institutions fail to satisfy the specific requirements for supporting the invisible hand. Often, 
they lack focus on the issues at hand, display a concentration of power, and suffer from conflicts of 
interest. Therefore, it would seem more appropriate to create a multitude of independent 
institutions, each designed to help to overcoming issues with the invisible hand in specific settings.  
                                                          
6 See also Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, e.g. Arrow (1951). 
7 The power structure among individuals before choices are made also plays an important role. Normally, the 
power structure for the voting process differs from the power structure in the market, which may make the 
voting process preferable to the market. But if it would be possible to modify the market power structure 
independently of the voting process, then this advantage of the political voting process would no longer apply 
(see Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). 
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For this purpose the three prototypes of institutions come to mind. The first type of institutions 
would focus on the coordination of clusters and networks; the second type would focus on providing 
guide-lines and regulations to contain opportunistic behaviour, e.g. in the financial system; and the 
third type of institutions would attempt to provide guidance and flexibility within ‘corridors of 
reason’ to address issues related to uncertainty and ‘fundamental ignorance’ about the future.8 
It may be tempting to consider centrally designing and managing such ‘tailor-made’ institutions to 
address the specific problems of different parts of the economy, leaving competitive markets in place 
where they are appropriate. This approach may make sense in a world in which the most important 
future scenarios and their likelihoods of arising are known to the centre, but less so in the presence 
of information that is private to individuals and of partial ignorance about the future. 
Firstly, the type of arguments that speak against centrally planned economies may apply.9 It may 
prove impossible to obtain and to process the relevant information. Also, the information gathered 
may be vulnerable to manipulation. Secondly, due to these distortions as well as to the presence of 
partial ignorance, regular adjustments of individual institutions’ ‘corridors of reason’ would be 
required, potentially affecting the functioning of other institutions. This would create problems in 
the institutional sphere of the economy that are similar to the problems which the Social Market 
Economy solved for the production sector by encouraging decentralized production and relying on 
the invisible hand to resolve coordination issues. It would seem a contradiction to decentralize 
society’s production and consumption decisions by actively centralizing planning and management of 
its institutional structure.  
 
6. Legitimacy of Institutions 
The decentralized production and consumption decisions are directed by the self-interest of firms 
and consumers. The decisions of consumers are guided by their usefulness toward achieving the 
consumers’ ultimate individual goals, often expressed by ‘utility’ as a measure of usefulness. 
Production decisions of the firms are guided by their contributions towards securing the firm’s 
overall productive success, as indicated by its long term profits. Through the process of competition, 
profitable firms prosper and unprofitable firms perish. 
Decentralized operation and evolution of institutions would be in line with the spirit of the Social 
Market Economy. The process could be designed along the lines of the decentralized production 
sector. Firms tend to focus on the production of a restricted range of products; individual institutions 
would be focused on a restricted part of the economy only. The restriction could be thematic, 
sectoral, geographical, or combinations thereof. Where the usefulness and success of firms is 
measured by their overall long term profit, the usefulness and success of institutions could be 
measured by the legitimacy they acquire. Typically, the legitimacy of an institution will reflect a 
combination of its effectiveness in achieving its stated goals and of its acceptance by the general 
public. The decentralized dynamics of the society’s economically relevant institutional structure 
could now result from a suitable form of ‘competition’ between the individual institutions. 
                                                          
8 This terminology relates to the concepts of ‘incalculable risk’, ‘fundamental uncertainty’, ‘ambiguity’, 
‘Knightian uncertainty’ and ‘Keynesian uncertainty’. They all share the common feature of ‘not knowing (within 
bounds)’. 
9 See e.g. Hayek (1944). 
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Institutions which achieve high levels of legitimacy would prosper, whilst institutions that fail to 
achieve the required levels of legitimacy would perish, either by being reformed or by being 
abolished.10 
In the context of ‘competition of institutions’ based on their legitimacy, the question arises how the 
required dynamics for the evolution of institutions can be achieved and implemented.11 In particular: 
who will manage this process and in the interest of whom? Managing this process clearly is a political 
task, which should be resolved in the political sphere. But it may be so complicated that within the 
constraints of their often demanding everyday lives, many members of the electorate may struggle 
to acquire a deep understanding of the issues involved. In this context, it makes sense for the 
electorate to temporarily delegate their power to accountable, specialized, representatives of their 
trust and choice. It would seem that this is best achieved by means of a modern representative 
democracy, acting on behalf of its sovereign, the electorate.12 
The codification of key principles and procedures in difficult-to-change constitutions and treaties by 
elected representatives, in accordance with the wishes and best interests of the electorate at the 
time, is a valid part of the process. Delegating power by creating subordinate institutions of different 
shapes and forms also is. Such subordinate institutions themselves may, for example, contain 
elements of direct or representative democracy, as is the case in local governments; they may be 
independent, like the judiciary; or they may encourage a range of different forms of civic 
engagement, as in different thematic movements or in political parties. Presumably, the legitimacy of 
such subordinate institutions serves as an approximate measure for the degree of support they have 
with the sovereign, i.e. with the electorate. 
 
7. Principles of Economic Policy 
The aim of the Social Market Economy is to operationalize the mechanism of the invisible hand on 
the basis of a small number of key principles and policies. Its traditional principles and policies relate 
to obtaining an efficient competitive market allocation; to securing suitable private property rights; 
                                                          
10 Some of the relevant policy issues surpass economics. They may involve the general areas of ethics, justice, 
and welfare, as well as general areas of political science, democracy, administration, and philosophy of law. In 
the contexts of economics, of redistribution, and of civic society participation in various institutions and 
institutional settings, a similar type of question arises: who is the sovereign? When facing a range of different 
views on what may be an appropriate re-distribution: how is a decision arrived at? Who decides on the forms 
and shapes in which the civic society participation takes place? How are the ‘rules of engagement’ decided on? 
The questions all boil down to: who decides in the end? In the terminology used above: who is the sovereign? 
In time-tested everyday language: where does the buck stop? 
11 In the context of structures of bilateral exchange institutions, this is one of the questions discussed in 
Spanjers (1997). 
12 Robinson (2016) argues that institutions can arise in two ways: driven by the state or driven by civic society. 
The former is referred to as ‘top-down’, the latter as ‘bottom-up’. A simple stationary dynamic model is used to 
illustrate that the optimal outcome is achieved if there is a balance of power between the ‘state’ and ‘civic 
society’. In the absence of an approximate balance of power, the dominated group becomes disengaged. This 
not only carries the risk of distorting the institutional structure, it may also induce the state to direct a sub-
optimal level of effort and resources towards maintaining and improving the institutional structure. In the 
context of our discussion, the state may perhaps be interpreted as the elected representatives, and civic 
society as the electorate.  
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to providing a stable and predictable policy environment; and to securing social balance. In practice, 
this boils down to proving a framework securing an effective legal system; eliminating economic 
concentrations of power; ensuring political good governance; and proving equal opportunities whilst 
balancing social security with incentives to perform well. 
In the light of the above discussion of the contemporary critical issues in economics, it is clear that 
these key principles no longer suffice and need to be supplemented by further principles. These 
additional principles should relate to the effective coordination of agglomerations, clusters, and 
network effects; they should ensure a balance between trust, monitoring, and accountability in the 
face of potential opportunistic behaviour as in significant parts of the financial system; and they 
should encourage sufficient flexibility to facilitate ventures into the unknown, whilst providing 
sufficient security to ensure appropriate levels of funding for such ventures. Identifying appropriate 
additional economic principles on the basis of solid economic insights is our main purpose.  
In the context of the proposed competition between institutions, however, it will not suffice to focus 
on economic principles alone. To ensure a functioning competition between institutions based on 
their legitimacy, a number of political principles need to be adhered to too. As argued above, the 
political system should be organized as a representative democracy.  
A constitutional rule may require that group decisions are to be taken on the basis of consensus 
amongst a given proportion of the electorate, or among their representatives. In this context, 
agreement based on simple majorities is a well-known mechanism in democratic societies. Still, in 
some cases, even this simple majority rule requires institutional constraints. For example, the 
consensus of a required proportion of the electorate on a specific issue can be circumvented by 
multi-issue coalition formation. Thus, under a voting mechanism distortions may occur which are 
similar to those emerging under non-representative individual decisions. 
Either way, there is a strong need for civil liberties to be upheld, for tolerance, and for respect for 
others and their views. All of these are not only necessary for the representative democracy to 
function effectively, but also to ensure that the legitimacy of institutions – which is partially based on 
the perception of the public and of the electorate – is an adequate measure of the institutions’ 
effectiveness. 
 
8. Identifying Additional Contemporary Principles 
The principles proposed by Walter Eucken (1952, Book 4, Chapter 16) are the basis for the Social 
Market Economy. To identify addition principles to supplement them, we start by considering 
specific aspects of the prototypical solutions for each of the specified areas of special interest. We 
then proceed by translating these aspect into more general principles. 
When considering clusters, agglomerations, and network effects, there seem to be two key issues to 
be dealt with. The first is the effective coordination of decisions relating to the relevant geographical 
or sectoral conglomerates. This coordination tries to capture the benefits of the positive external 
effects open to the units within the conglomerate, whilst minimizing the negative external effects. 
The second issue is to contain the inequality resulting from the divide between those inside the 
conglomerates and those outside of them; geographically this could be an urban/rural divide. The 
first issue can be addressed by the creation of appropriate coordinating institutions for the individual 
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conglomerates. Dealing with second issue, however, requires institutions or policies ensuring equal 
opportunities for ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’; securing a sufficiently advanced general level of 
infrastructure which enables traditional economic development outside the conglomerates; and 
guaranteeing comparable living standards inside and outside the conglomerates. The latter would be 
much facilitated by disconnecting wage income receipts from labour costs through an appropriate 
system of income taxes and income subsidies. Such policy would also provide an effective tool for 
reducing and directing migration pressures.13 14  
When considering the prototypical institutions for dealing with opportunistic behaviour within the 
financial system, the same key principles come to mind that are at the heart of successful policy 
implementation in general. First of all, there is the requirement of transparency. In addition, the 
appropriate use of ex-ante scrutinizing; ad interim monitoring; and ex-post auditing would help 
containing the negative effects of opportunistic behaviour as far as is reasonably possible. In 
particular, it is crucial to enhance the system’s stability and legitimacy by reducing the negative 
consequences of the limited liability effect in the financial sector. The latter can be achieved by 
assuring appropriate levels of equity to reduce incentives for opportunistic behaviour and to absorb 
reasonable ‘worst case’ losses. A multitude of financial innovations has recently been developed to 
absorb losses when capital falls below a threshold level in times of financial distress. Contingent 
convertible capital instruments (CoCos) are an example in the case of banks. Due to their capacity to 
absorb losses, many hybrid capital securities have the potential to satisfy regulatory capital 
requirements.15 
For dealing with uncertainty, it is useful to distinguish between two types of it. The first type relates 
to information that is available to society as a whole, but not to all relevant individual decision 
makers. The second type of uncertainty is about information which fails to be available at all. In the 
former case, the principle of transparency would be of help. It would be supported by as would be 
the presence of strong, independent, objective, pluralistic information media and a culture of open 
factual discussions, in line with the freedom of expression. In dealing with uncertainty due to 
information not being available to the society as a whole, it is important to be aware of this 
ignorance, i.e. that ‘we just don't know (yet)’.16 
Dealing with ignorance requires tolerance regarding differing opinions as well as the flexibility to 
swiftly and effectively react to new information when it becomes available. This flexibility can be 
achieved in a number of ways. Transparency facilitates the diffusion of the new information as it 
arises. The presence of sufficient levels and quality of entrepreneurship make it possible to swiftly 
                                                          
13 See also Weber (1909), Krugman and Venables (1990), and Krugman (1991). 
14 As convincingly shown by Helpman (2016), wage inequality is mainly related to technology, viz, technological 
progress and cluster and agglomeration effects. Wage inequality tends to occur at the top of the income 
distribution, making some better off, generally without making others worse off. Still, this kind of Pareto 
improvement may require policy intervention as it causes some groups not to participate fairly in society’s 
progress. This situation becomes even more problematic if there is a geographical dimension to this increase in 
inequality.  
15 See f.e. Calomiris (2013). 
16 See Keynes (1921), Knight (1921) and Keynes (1937). For a more mathematical treatment see e.g. Ellsberg 
(1961), Schmeidler (1989), and Chateauneuf et al. (2007). For an application of uncertainty (in the form of 
‘ambiguity’) to financial decisions see, f.e., Agliardi, Agliardi and Spanjers (2016).  
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benefit from new the economic opportunities and to react appropriately to emerging challenges. 
Finally, an open and flexible institutional structure allows swift and appropriate adaption to new 
societal coordination and policy issues that may result. A further way to deal with the issue of not-
knowing is to reduce the extent of the society’s ignorance by generating knowledge, e.g. through 
fostering curiosity and experimenting, through education, and through research. 
As will be shown below, in some cases existing institutions do not seem to work properly. This is due 
to mistakenly transferring the behavioural postulate of the homo oeconomicus to individuals in their 
political or public choice roles. If politicians, technocrats, or the dominant elite decide what is the 
‘common good’ for society, and behave as if they maximize the social welfare function reflecting 
their version of the ‘common good’, then new distortions will appear. As a result, politics may 
become dysfunctional for channelling individual self-interest into the common good. In the words of 
Buchanan (1991): ‘There are no superior agents – morally superior – that can use their power for 
some public interest’, while at the same time, ‘there is no economic theory of politics obtained from 
the behavior of individual choices’. The challenge is to design institutions or rules that may limit the 
distortions due to individual self-interested behaviour. Such institutions need to be dynamic and 
sufficiently flexible to adapt to evolving circumstances over time. 
 
9. Proposed Principles of the Contemporary Social Market Economy 
Our list of proposed principles for the contemporary Social Market Economy extends and slightly 
adapts Walter Eucken’s original list, which was aimed at operationalizing the principle of the invisible 
hand. 17 The proposed new principles are organized under the headings ‘Economic principles’, 
‘Political principles’, and ‘The long run’. They summarize the above discussion. 
 
1. Economic principles 
a) Markets 
i. Private property (Eucken’s Fundamental Principle 2) 
ii. Freedom of contract (Eucken’s Fundamental Principle 3) 
iii. Competitive markets (Eucken’s Fundamental Principle 1) 
b) External Effects (locational and others) 
i. Comparable living standards 
ii. (Inter regional) Fiscal transfers 
iii. Disconnecting (labour) costs from (wage) income 
c) Opportunistic behaviour 
i. Accountability 
ii. Partial liability (modifies Eucken’s Fundamental Principle 4: Liability) 
iii. Systemic stability 
2. Political principles 
a) Social Policy 
i. Equal opportunities 
ii. Social security 
                                                          
17 Eucken (1952, Book 4, Chapter 16, Sections 3 to 7). See also van Suntum et al. (2011). 
Willem Spanjers and Elettra Agliardi    Rethinking The Social Market Economy     
12/20 
iii. Distance between wage income and social security payments 
b) Institutions 
i. Independence 
ii. Legitimacy 
iii. Subsidiarity 
c) Governance 
i. Rule of law 
ii. Representative democracy 
iii. Civic liberties 
3. The long run 
a) Dynamics 
i. Entrepreneurship 
ii. Flexibility 
iii. Predictable framework (extends Eucken’s Fundamental Principle 5: Predictable 
Policy) 
b) Uncertainty 
i. Transparency 
ii. Research and experimenting 
iii. Tolerance. 
 
 
In the following four sections we refer to one broad policy area each to illustrate these principles: 
regional policy; monetary policy; the financial system; and environmental policy. In the examples, we 
treat ‘policies’ and ‘institutions’ as interchangeable, since institutions provide a specific way of 
implementing policies. The bold numbers in squared brackets indicate the specific principles that 
apply. 
Regional policy is illustrated by the EU’s structural policy and by economic aspects of German 
reunification in 1990 and thereafter. Under the heading of monetary policy we discuss independent 
central banks and the introduction of the Euro. The financial crises we focus on are the Financial 
Crisis of 2008 – 2010 and Euro crisis. Finally, under sustainability we focus on environmental policy 
and discuss the degrading of the earth’s environment and the depletion of its natural resources, as 
well as global warming and the reduction in biodiversity. 
 
10. Regional Policy 
 
German Reunification 
One of the main forces bringing about German reunification was the deep and persistent loss of 
legitimacy of the government and governance structures in the GDR, i.e. former communist East 
Germany. [2bii; 2c] The political and economic reunification of the country required a change in its 
governance structure, which was implemented by transferring the institutions of the FRG (West 
Germany) to the East of the country. This had two advantages. Firstly, only a relatively small amount 
of institutions had to be newly designed; most institutions had been thoroughly tried-and-tested. 
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Secondly, with the transferring of these institutions, their legitimacy was also transferred, greatly 
contributing to (institutional) stability in times of historical change. 
In line with the traditional principles of the Social Market Economy, the economic strategy for 
German reunification was based on the principles of competition and the workings of the invisible 
hand. On this basis, it was expected that economic reunification would be completed within a period 
of five to ten years, without requiring significant amounts of government expenditure, except for the 
provision of training and of general infrastructure during a period of transition. Although the policy 
was very successful in many respects, this expectation was disappointed.  
The competitive advantages of the West German economic structures due to clusters, 
agglomerations, and network effects proved effectively impossible to overcome for the East. After 25 
years, only in areas where economics policies have taken into account cluster and agglomeration 
effects from the outset, the economic outlook seems positive. But even here economic sustainability 
still is far away. [1b] 
The slow convergence process, combined with large differences in living standards, created strong 
migration pressures. To contain these pressures, living standards in the East had to be improved 
dramatically. [2a] Wages were increased much quicker than productivity allowed for, causing 
unemployment and further hampering economic convergence. The economic, social, and political 
situation could and can only be sustained by continued very large transfer payments in different  
shapes and forms. [1b] 
EU Regional Policy 
Regional disparities in living standards, economic performance, and opportunities for development 
undermine the legitimacy of the EU. The EU’s Structural Fund and its Cohesion Fund help to reduce 
these disparities by providing financial support for appropriate projects. [1bi; 1bii; 2ai] The available 
funding is in the order of magnitude of annually € 50 Mrd. Other EU funds also have aspects 
supporting regional development. 
EU Economic Policy 
The sluggishness of the European economy undermined the legitimacy of EU’s economic policy 
agenda. As a response the Lisbon Strategy (or Lisbon Agenda) was developed. Its intention was to 
make the EU: ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’, by 2010. The 
strategy is based on innovation, the knowledge economy, and social and environmental renewal. 
[3ai; 3aii; 3bii] Specific measures are to be carried out by individual member states. EU support takes 
the form of, amongst others, Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development 
and Joint Technology Initiatives. The current framework programme Horizon 2020 is endowed with 
over € 10 Mrd per year. Multi-national research activities in joint ventures under the Joint 
Technology Initiatives are supported by the EU with annually € 3 Mrd. 
 
 
 
 
Willem Spanjers and Elettra Agliardi    Rethinking The Social Market Economy     
14/20 
11. Monetary Policy and the Financial System 
Independent Central Banks 
The primacy of monetary policy for achieving monetary stability is considered to be the corner stone 
of economic policy by Eucken.18 The Social Market Economy considers a stable value of money to be 
crucial too. In Germany, this traditionally was reflected in the monetary policy of the independent 
Bundesbank. [3aiii] 
In most countries, monetary policy used to be at the discretion of the government, be it directly or 
indirectly. As a consequence, there was a temptation for monetary policy to be used for political 
purposes as well as for achieving economic objectives. This compromised its economic effectiveness 
and monetary policy lost much of its legitimacy.19 
A change of institutional structure, following the successful example of the the Bundesbank, restored 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of monetary policy. Independent central banks were created and 
endowed with clearly defined objectives, typically in the form of inflation targets. [1ci; 2bi; 2bii] 
Creation of the Euro 
Exchange rate regimes range from fixed exchange rates to free floating exchange rates. Different 
intermediate forms of semi-fixed exchange rates seemed to provide the optimal combination of 
predictability and flexibility. But independent national currencies lost legitimacy as exchange rate 
policy was used as a tool for achieving political objectives.  
After the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, the European exchange rate mechanism (EMS) was 
created to ensure exchange rate stability, whilst maintaining a desirable measure of flexibility. 
Although marred by competitive devaluations, the system served its purpose until it collapsed due to 
political conflict. [1ciii] 
The collapse of the exchange rate mechanism damaged the credibility of a system of semi-fixed 
exchange rates in Europe beyond repair. The remaining choice now was between flexible exchange 
rates or irrevocably fixed exchange rates in the form of a single currency. As a myriad of small 
currency turned out to have become unworkable, a single currency in the form of the Euro was 
introduced. This repaired the vulnerability of the EMS' legitimacy due to political interference, at the 
expense of the vulnerability of Euro's legitimacy due to the absence of effective instruments to 
dampen the impact and contagion of national and international economic shocks. 
 
12. Financial Crises 
The financial system’s main function is to align current financial decisions with their future 
consequences through the buying and selling of securities, i.e. of promises of future (re-)payment 
under specified conditions. This facilitates investment, fosters growth, and enhances living standards. 
But the future is uncertain and the conditions of the promises can be manipulated, so the financial 
system also creates possibilities for destabilizing opportunistic behaviour. Thus, the organisation of 
the financial system involves a trade-off between growth and stability. [1ciii] 
                                                          
18 Eucken (1952, Book 4, Chapter 16, Section 2). See also Bofinger (2016) who considers Eucken’s contribution 
from a macro-economic policy perspective. In the context of Eucken (1952), Bofinger’s perspective is 
surprising, to say the least. 
19 See e.g. Barro and Gordon (1983). 
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The complexities of our age broaden the ‘corridors of reason’ of the plausible values for the 
economy’s securities. The particular value of the securities within this range is ‘a matter of 
judgement’ and is largely determined by psychological factors. Such factors include individual 
investors’ levels of optimism and pessimism, i.e. their tendencies toward ‘hoping for the best’ and 
‘fearing the worst’. A broadening of the ‘corridors of reason’ as during financial crises reduces the 
stability of the financial system. 
There are two basic ways to counteract such increased tendency toward instability. The first is to 
reduce the incentives for opportunistic behaviour within the financial system. This can be achieved 
by intensifying monitoring, by increasing accountability, and by ensuring appropriate levels of liability 
in the context of prudential regulation. [1ci; 1cii] The second way to reduce the tendency to 
instability is to narrow the ‘corridors of reason’ as perceived by investors. This can be achieved by 
increasing transparency and by providing a safety net of guarantees to systemically relevant financial 
institutions. 20 [3bi] 
The financial crisis 
In the run-up to the financial crisis, an ineffective structure of regulations and regulatory institutions 
created serious vulnerabilities of the financial system. This became apparent to all in the sub-prime 
mortgage crises. Inappropriate political decisions in the run-up to the US presidential elections 
destroyed the confidence in the political establishment's ability and willingness to contain the sub-
prime mortgage crisis. This turned the sub-prime mortgage crisis into a full blown international 
financial crisis. 
The financial crisis virtually wiped out the legitimacy of the existing national and the international 
institutions governing the financial sector. Eventually, this resulted in changes in these institutions 
and the associated regulations. In the context of prudential regulation this led to, amongst others, 
the Basel III agreement. 21 [2bii] 
In the context of the EU, the financial crisis triggered changes in its financial regulation and its 
regulatory financial institutions too. The EU’s Banking Union with a ‘Single Rulebook’ was created, 
governing the financial sector throughout the EU. It covers the implementation of the Basel III 
agreement, of deposit insurance, and of procedures addressing failing financial institutions. [1ciii; 
2biii] For the Eurozone, the Banking Union is supplemented by the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
and the Single Resolution Mechanism. 
The Euro crisis 
The financial crisis exposed the inability of a number of EU member states to independently absorb 
its fiscal impact. Failing banks needed refunding during a steep recession, a monumental task which 
stretched the confidence of the financial markets in governments' ability and willingness to 
implement the necessary policy changes. The resulting vicious circle severely undermined the 
legitimacy of the financial system, of individual governments and national political systems, and of 
the project of European integration. 
                                                          
20 See e.g. Spanjers (2011). 
21 Knight (2016) provides an overview of the key reforms to bank regulation and the global financial system. In 
this context, he proposes additional specific regulation for Originate-to-Hold financial institutions to ensure 
that these institutions are allowed to buy what they may perceive as under-priced financial assets in times of 
crisis. 
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This enormous loss of legitimacy of a broad range of institution in Europe was counteracted by the 
creation of a number of generously funded new EU institutions and policies. [2bii; 2biii] This 
provided a focused boost to European integration in the general areas of regulation and financial and 
fiscal policy, in a desperate attempt of regain lost legitimacy and popular acceptance. 
The changes involve improved financial regulation and procedures for the rescue of failing banks, 
replacing national policies by EU frameworks. [1ciii] They also involved the creation of new EU level 
institutions addressing emerging and existing fiscal problems, repairing weaknesses in the framework 
of the Maastricht Treaty.  
These changes cumulated in the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with the aim of 
supporting EU member states in financial difficulties in order to contain contagion effects. It replaces 
the transitional institutions of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European 
Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM). The European Fiscal Compact (EFC) replaces the defunct 
Stability and Growth Pact regarding member states’ fiscal policy. 
 
13. Sustainability 
The sustainability of the earth’s natural environment and the depletion of some of its natural 
resources is one of the most important, complicated, and controversial problems mankind is facing. 
The degrading of the natural environment and the depletion of the exhaustible resources cannot go 
on forever, and the ‘tipping point’ and doom always seem near. Fortunately, the saving grace of 
innovation always seems close at hand too.22 
Fundamental uncertainty is at the heart of the dilemma. We can imagine the catastrophes that may 
lay ahead if technology and policy remain unchanged. But we have no way of knowing the 
possibilities that invention and innovation may create for us. [3ai; 3bii] A mere century ago, a vision 
of our current reality would defy the boldest imagination. [3biii] To the extent that we don’t know 
the possibilities the future may hold in store, we are caught in a ‘corridor of reason’ created by our 
ignorance, torn between hoping for the best and fearing the worst. 
Even though not all can be foreseen, our stewardship of the earth on behalf of future generations 
requires us to follow a path of ensured sustainability throughout the ‘corridor of reason’, if such path 
is available. [3aii] If it is not, we would be required to establish sustainability for as much of the 
‘corridor of reason’ as is reasonably possible under the circumstances. 
The effects of environmental degradation and the depletion of exhaustible resources, be they fossil 
fuels, water reserves, or arable land, will not affect all regions to a similar degree. Transfer payments 
to disproportionally disadvantaged regions may be required, both to ensure acceptable regional 
living standards and to build a new future for those affected.  
                                                          
22 As outlined in Jones (2016), however, it would seem that ‘Ideas total factor productivity’ (a measure of 
innovation through new ideas) is falling, since over the last two centuries significantly more resources need to 
be employed to maintain a more-or-less constant growth rate of the overall economy of about 2% per year. 
Calculations suggest that to maintain this growth rate the amount of resources devoted to research and 
development on average need to be doubled every 12 years. The only relevant effect that may not have been 
fully incorporated into these numbers is the effect of ‘crazy ideas’ (as in science fiction of, e.g. Jules Verne in his 
time, or Isaac Asimov) becoming reality. 
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Global warming 
The release of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by the use of fossil fuels causes global warming, 
which undermines the legitimacy of the excessive use of fossil fuels and the economic and political 
systems that depend on them23.  
Policies and institutions have been and are being developed to address the issue of reducing 
emissions at regional, international, and global levels. The Kyoto Protocol created three flexible 
emission reduction mechanisms: International Emissions Trading; the Clean Development 
Mechanism; and Joint Implementation. [3aii] Developed countries tend to have their own 
mechanisms for trading emissions; in the EU this is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.  
The Paris Agreement is considered to provide the first-ever legally binding global climate agreement. 
[2biii] It sets out an ambitious global agenda with the aim of reaching ‘climate neutrality’ before the 
end of the century. For the first time, it introduces strategies to reduce climate change damages, 
both in terms of mitigation of greenhouse gasses and of adaptation to climate change. Mitigation 
addresses the source of the climate change problem by reducing the amount of emitted greenhouse 
gasses. It typically deals with a global public good aspect. Adaptation, in contrast, provides purely 
local benefits, usually limited to the period in which adaptation takes place. 
Policies and institutions have been and are being developed to encourage and support the 
development of new technologies for addressing the problem of global warming, e.g. by reducing the 
dependency on fossil fuels, by reducing the carbon dioxide emission they cause, and by capturing 
excessive carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. [3ai; 3bii] 
Biodiversity 
As with global warming and the management of exhaustible resources, the extinction of species is 
perceived to be at odds with our stewardship of the earth. Thus, it contributes to inter-generational 
conflict, undermining the legitimacy of the economic use of the environment, and indirectly 
undermining the legitimacy of the current economic order and political system. It is a further 
example of ‘moral anarchy’.24 
Preservation policies for maintaining biodiversity are being adopted at national level and through 
international cooperation. These policies include the protection and re-establishment of priority 
ecosystems, as well as developing a strategic, integrated approach towards sustainability and 
biodiversity.  
 
14. Concluding Remarks 
This paper is intended to contribute to rethinking the basic principles of the Social Market Economy. 
During most of the second half of the twentieth century these principles provided a workable 
summary of economic theory for supporting ‘best practice’ economic policy. But there have been 
                                                          
23 In most simulations global warming has been shown to be almost proportional to cumulative carbon dioxide 
emissions, which makes the climate response to carbon dioxide emissions (the so-called “carbon-climate 
response”, CCR) a measure which can be used to calculate the cumulative emissions compatible with a  2°C (or 
1.5°C) warming target (Matthews, Gillett, Stott and Zickfeld, 2009). 
24 For the concept of ‘moral anarchy’ see Nozick (1971) and Buchanan (1991). 
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significant changes in economic structures and in technology, causing the traditional principles to 
have become incomplete and to have lost much of their effectiveness. 
Due to these changes, important aspects of contemporary economies are no longer adequately 
represented in the traditional economic model of competition in markets, which is the foundation of 
the Social Market Economy. We discuss the main discrepancies and arrive at the conclusion that 
contemporary market-based economic policy needs to supplement competition in markets – based 
in the principle of scarcity – with competition between (economic) institutions, based on their 
legitimacy. 
We propose to extend the traditional principles of the social market economy with additional 
economic principles, with political principles, including representative democracy and upholding civic 
liberties, as well as with principles for coping with the uncertainty of the more distant future. 
We do not expect this paper to provide a final solution to the fiendishly difficult problem of 
constructing a coherent policy framework for a decentralized economic order. But we do hope that it 
reinforces the need for such framework, also and especially in our current turbulent times, and we 
hope that it may, perhaps, provide a useful starting point for a fruitful discussion on these and 
related issues. 
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